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Abstract. The Covid-19 pandemic raised a few issues concerning how market participants 
react to a global pandemic. The pandemic was a black swan event on some levels; there had 
been few pandemics that have had such a global impact: the Spanish Flu of the late 1910s 
and 1957 influenza. Moreover, global interconnection means that the Covid-19 pandemic 
was able to spread across the globe quickly, thus indicating that extreme measures were 
needed to bring it under control. The policies taken by governments around the world had 
a significant adverse impact on the economy. It is with these factors in mind that we 
research the psychology of the market participants during the pandemic. Conversely, we 
introduce a new model of behaviour during uncertainty, which explains how market 
participants react during crises such as the Covid-19 pandemic. The model analyses the 
psychological issues, both emotional and cognitive, influencing the pandemic. We found 
that like any other crises, market participant reacted to government actions and 
announcements and the impact on the economy. Therefore, leading to the old issue of 
miscommunication and insufficient actions. 
Keywords. Behavioural economics, COVID-19, Emotions, Cognitive, Pandemic, Economic 
crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
nfluenced by the seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973), (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), the theory of behavioural economics dictates that it is 
homo sapiens and not homo economicus that make decisions about every 
aspect of economics as pointed by (Thaler, 2016). Thus meaning 
psychological and sentimental factors influence the decision-making 
process, which is made difficult by the uncertainty surrounding the 
decision. Moreover, the opposite scales of emotional behaviour, greed and 
fear, often play a critical role in the process. Additionally, the process is 
usually clouded by behavioural biases and heuristics. Conversely, the key 
to understanding the decision-making process during a period of 
uncertainty is thru the analysis of these behavioural factors.  
Furthermore, several external factors and actors could play an 
influencing role in the decision-making process; these externalities change 
with the underlying context of the period or event. These externalities 
could include factors such as financial, political, economical, nature and 
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health; however, the actors also play a critical role: governmental, financial 
and consumers. Thus, pointing to a requirement to research these 
externalities to gain a more accurate and full picture of the market trend 
during a period of uncertainty. The uncertainty behavioural factor model is 
derived as a top-level view of these externalities and behavioural factors 
influencing the market participants decisions during an uncertain period, 
an extreme example of which is the unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic.  
On 31 December 2019, the Chinese authorities informed the World 
Health Organisation (there after known as WHO) of the emergence of a 
new viral disease in the city of Wuhan.  According to  (Sohrabi et al., 2020), 
the virus had infected 27 people with links to the Hunan Seafood Whole 
sale Market, which trades in fish and live animals. As stated by (Sohrabi et 
al., 2020),  the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
WHO identified the new virus as a new increment of the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrom Coronavirus; subsequently named COVID-19 by the 
WHO. On 30 January 2020, the WHO declared the Chinese COVID-19 
outbreak as a Public Health Emergencyof International Concern; however, 
on 11 March 2020, Covid-19 was revised from epidemic to pandemic 
status2 . The globalisation and highly infective nature of the COVID-19 
pandemic from such a niche beginning is exceptionally worrying. The 
global statistics as of 30 June 2020 stands at approximately 10.27millions 
cases with 505.30 thousands deaths according to the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (there after known as ECDPC). These 
statistics illustrate how unprepared the global community was in the face 
of such an infectious disease. Moreover, they show that the global 
community never learns from past events and always seem to 
underestimate events.  
According to the statistics from the ECDPC, the first reported confirmed 
UK case was on 31 January 2020. However, the initial spike in new cases of 
COVID-19 did not occur until 2 March 2020 when the number of daily 
confirmed cases rose to 13. Furthermore, this number quickly rose above 
1,000 by 22 March 2020, a few days later the number became consistently 
over 1,000 peaking at 8,719 on 12 April 2020. The total COVID-19 cases and 
deaths stand at 311,965 and 43,575 respectively as of 30June 2020, thus 
making the UK the worst country in Europe by pure figures according to 
the ECDPC. So how did the UK get its policies so wrong and did not react 
to the COVID-19 pandemic quick enough? The signs were there from the 
rest of Europe; Italy, for instance, spiked to over 1,000 new cases on 8 
March 2020. So, the UK had a window of 14 days to prepare; yet the UK‘s 
government did not react until 12 March 2020, according to (Hunter, 2020). 
Remember, the number of daily new cases rose to more than ten on 2 
March 2020; thus, the UK’s government remained inactive on the COVID-
19 front for ten days after. According to (Hunter, 2020), even then there was 
no action or recommendations. It was not until 16 March 2020 that the UK’s 
government gave sound advice as conferred by (Hunter, 2020). However, 
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actions did not come until 18 March 2020 when based on the guidance of a 
medical report by Imperial College schools were closed, as stated by 
(Hunter, 2020). Nevertheless, the law enforced social distancing and 
lockdown orders did not come until 23 March 2020, when the total number 
of cases has risen above 5,000.    
The lockdown order meant the closure of non-essential businesses, only 
food retailers, pharmacies and banks could open. According to a weekly 
report by Price Waterhouse Coopers dated 13 May 2020, the impact on 
GDP is likely to be between 5 and 10%. Furthermore, the report forecasts a 
budget deficit of 10 to 15% of GDP, thus having a significant impact on the 
total debt. Remember, the deficit ceiling is 3% of GDP to maintain 
sustainable long-term fiscal policies. The report points to 28% of the 
workforce furloughed as a possible reason for the low impact on the 
unemployment rate. However, this is likely to change because of the 
lockdown impact on the financial status of many organisations.  
While there can be no doubt that the Covid-19 pandemic did affect the 
financial markets, we are under no illusion that any impact pales into 
insignificant in comparison to the effect on the general public and NHS 
staff. As so elegantly put by (Wren-Lewis, 2020, p.109), ‚It is worth saying at 
the start that the bottom line of all this for me is that the economics are secondary 
to the health consequences for any pandemic that has a significant fatality rate.‛ 
However, as hinted by (Wren-Lewis, 2020), financial economics is a vital 
subject in its own rights, and as a warning not to take drastic actions that 
do not positively influence the mortality nor infectious rate. Moreover, it is 
hard not to analyse the impact of Covid-19 on a vital sector of Western 
capitalism, the financial markets. Nevertheless, as (Wren-Lewis, 2020) 
states, there is no meaningful trade-off between the reduction on the 
mortality rate and the GDP or financial market.  
According to (Baker et al., 2020a), the impact of Covid-19 on the equity 
market was unprecedented; indeed, very few episodes can match the high 
volatility levels or loss. At its lowest on 23 March 2020, the FTSE 100 has 
loss 2,548.6, an unprecedented 33.79%, of its value since 31 December 2019.  
thus, there is a requirement to analyse market participants behaviour 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the psychological impact on 
the market participants reactions may provide clues as to the behaviour of 
the population during the COVID-19 pandemic. During any event that has 
a considerable adverse effect on the mindset of any human, the critical 
behavioural trait is fear. However, there is anobligation to explain the 
behavioural reasonings influencing the fear reactions during this pandemic. 
Hence, this article will use behavioural economics to explain the impact on 
market participants.  
The main contribution of the paper is the uncertainty behavioural factor 
model which gives an illustrative view of the factors influencing the 
decision-making process of market participants during a period of 
uncertainty. It shows the influence of behavioural psychological and 
emotional factors, such as biases and heuristics, on the market participants. 
It also illustrates the effect of events and external factors/actors on the 
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decision-making process. There is a definite requirement to analyse these 
factors/actors to understand the actions of the market participants. Therein 
lays the key to the second contribution of the model, the model is derived 
to illustrate the impact of such events and external factors/actors.    
Another crucial side contribution to the model is the derivation of four 
new heuristics and biases in the explanation of the impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic: 
 Relative Time Influence bias is the tendency to let the most recent 
past event or information cloud a judgement. The influence diminishes 
with time as new events or information occurs. This bias is connected to 
the event-time conjuncture. 
 Political-effect heuristic is the tendency for the actions or inactions 
of policymakers to affect the decision-making process of the market 
participants. 
 Media Effect heuristic is the tendency to associate extreme events 
with TV programmes or films.  
 Brexit Effect heuristic is the tendency to concentrate on Britain's exit 
of the EU disregarding all other information or events. Since Brexit is the 
most recent past event, thus the Brexit effect is a by-product of the 
relative time influence bias. 
However, there remains a requirement to test for these heuristics and 
biases in the real world. The tests should be implemented in questionnaire-
based research to analyse the response from a wide range of the 
population.  
The secondary contribution of this paper is the behavioural reaction 
analysis of the market participants to the Covid-19 pandemic. There have 
been a few papers on the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the financial 
market: 
 (Albulescu, 2020), study the effect of the announcements on the 
volatility of the financial market. 
 (Baker et al., 2020a), analyse the impact of the policy responses on 
the US equity.  
 (Corbet, Larkin & Lucey, 2020) examine the contagious effect in the 
financial market. 
 (Ramelli & Wagner, 2020) study the equity market reactions. 
 (Zhang, Hu & Ji, 2020) research the impact of country and systemic 
risks on the global financial markets. 
However, the key to understanding the impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic on the financial market is thru the analysis of the behavioural 
factors and external factors/actors influencing the decision-making process. 
The other critical element to consider is the context in which the decision is 
taken; the key here is the effect of any past events on the current 
environment. In the case of the Covid-19 pandemic effect on the UK’s 
financial market, the white elephant in the room is the ongoing Brexit 
process.  
In essence, our uncertainty behavioural factor model illustrated the 
mixture of cognitive and emotional biases and heuristics influencing the 
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Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, the model highlighted the impact of 
external factors and actors on the financial market during events such as 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, it demonstrated a principal idea in the 
behaviour of humans in general and market participants in particular; the 
impact of an information or event diminishes with time. The critical issue is 
that the most recent event often clouds the action of the actors during the 
event; during the Covid-19 pandemic, we suspect that Brexit did cloud the 
actions of the actors in the UK to a certain extent.  
To a certain extent, the Covid-19 pandemic did impact the global affairs 
like no other events in the past 60 years. Whether the Covid-19 pandemic 
could be classified as a black swan event depends on the initial 
assumptions. Indeed, in terms of global viral pandemics, there were two 
such cases during the last century: the 1918 Spanish Flue and 1957 
influenza. Moreover, the economic impact of the pandemic is often 
overstated in comparison to other recent economic crises such as the global 
financial and Eurozone debt crises. However, the key is the speed at which 
the Covid-19 pandemic was able to freeze everyday life and hike 
uncertainty, globally. This speed was the influential factor in the volatile 
global markets. And although many will point to the Dow Jones dropping 
15% approximately in 1957, it is debatable whether the decline was entirely 
due to the influenza pandemic. The ‚overreaction‛ by market participants 
during the Covid-19 pandemics meant that on 23 March 2020, the FTSE 100 
fell by an unprecedented 33.79% since 31 December 2019. 
The reactions of the market participants during the pandemic, once 
again point to the lack of communication and inactions by governments 
seen in most recent crises. However, the UK’s government did fix the issue 
later in the pandemic by acting firmly and communicating more often. Yet 
the actions were too late to reduce the impact of the virus, which made the 
UK the worst affected country in Europe. With potentially a second wave 
coming over the next few months, we advise any government to 
communicate effectively and act fast and stringently on both the health and 
economic fronts.    
Firstly, the paper lays the foundation of the uncertainty behavioural 
factor model, reviewing the theory of behavioural economic underpinning 
the model. In the next section, we discuss the Covid-19 pandemic and the 
UK’s response. We follow on with a brief analysis of the impact on the 
UK’s economy, including a review of the economic policy and consumers 
response. Next, we analyse the Covid-19 effect on the behaviour of market 
participants in the equity market. Finally, we conclude with a summary of 
the theoretical underpinnings of the model and impact of Covid-19 in 
general and on the behavioural factors influencing the decision-making 
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2. A brief review of the theories influencing the 
uncertainty behavioural factor model 
As illustrated by  Figure 1, there is an essential factor to consider in the 
analysis of the reaction of the financial markets to an uncertain event, the 
psychological impact on the market participants depend on the external 
factors such as economics, finance, policy, international affairs, and others 
such as health or natural.  For the psychological impact, we need to delve 
into the theory at the heart of our model: the theory of behavioural 
economics. Influenced by the seminal works of Tversky and Kahneman: 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); basically,  the theory dictates that it is the 
reactions of market participants that drive the trend in the market.  
 
 
Figure 1. The General Uncertainty Behavioural Factor Model 
 
Before we could delve onto the main factors of behavioural economics 
theory influencing our model, there is a need to review the primarily model 
underpinning behavioural economics; the prospect theory of (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  Market participants often 
violate the predictions of the traditional model of decision making, the 
theory of expected utility introduced by (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1944). As proposed, the expected utility theory argues that rational market 
participants should always opt to the option which maximises their 
earnings taking account of their risk aversion behaviour. The issue is 
market participants do not always make choices according to the rational 
choice behaviour underlining the expected utility theory. Two critical 
effects come into play when market participants are deciding amongst 
several risky option: certainty and isolation effects. The certainty effect 
states that market participants often underweight uncertain outcomes in 
comparison with specific results. Thus, contributing to risk aversion and 
risk-seeking in situations of individual gains and losses, respectively as 
hinted by (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Conversely, according to 
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(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979),  the isolation effect contend that in general 
market participants discard shared components amongst all prospects 
under consideration. Furthermore, as argued by both (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992) and (Barberis, 2013b), market participants are loss avert 
meaning they are more sensitive to loss than to gains of similar margins, no 
matter how small the losses are. 
 
 
Figure 2. Prospect Theory 
 
The prospect theory introduced by Kahneman and Tversky over two 
influential papers, (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), was an attempt to resolve the violations of the expected 
utility theory, as stated by (Barberis, 2013b). The original prospect theory, 
as illustrated by Figure 2, derived in (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), did 
overcome the main issues presented by the expected utility model. 
Additionally, (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) provided some essential 
insights into the working of the theory and is regarded as the influential 
paper on behavioural economics.   
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Prospect Theory 
 
However,  the prospect theory, as derived by (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) violated the first-order stochastic dominance. In overcoming this 
issue, (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) proposed a new version of the 
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prospective theory called cumulative prospect theory which employs a 
cumulative rather than separable decision weighing function, as illustrated 
by Figure 3. As derived by (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the prospect 
theory relies on four key characteristics of the human decision process: 
 Reference dependence, people evaluate the value of gains or losses 
from a reference point. 
 Loss aversion, people are more sensitive to losses than to gains as 
indicated by (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 Endowment effect, people demand more to give up an object than 
they are willing to pay. 
 Diminishing sensitivity, the marginal value of both gains and losses 
decreases with their size. 
The influencing idea behind behavioural economics is that market 
participants are not homo economicus; they are homo sapiens, a point 
illustrated by (Thaler, 2016). The key here is the reaction by market 
participants to news or events relative to the fundamental price as derived 
by the efficient market hypothesis of (Fama, 1965) and (Malkiel, 1962). As 
put by Bernard Baruch:  
 
“What is important in market fluctuations are not the events themselves but the 
human reactions to those events.” 
 
Moreover, as argued by (Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998), empirical 
evidence shows that market participants underreact to news and overreact 
to a series of good or bad news. The definition of underreaction is that 
average returns on any asset following good news is higher than average 
returns following bad news, which means that market participants 
underreact to the good news. Analogous to underreaction, the definition of 
overreaction takes the shape of average return following a series of good 
news is lower than the average return following a series of bad news, 
which means that market participants overreact to good news. Moreover, 
in both cases, the opposite reactions could also be correct. 
Additionally, behavioural economics attempts to describe the 
psychology and sentiment influencing the decision-making process of the 
market participants based on several heuristics and biases. As argued by 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), there is a constant overload of daily news 
and information; hence the requirement to simplify arises, this 
simplification is often called a heuristic. However, a heuristic may be a 
useful procedure in dealing with information overload; yet, there is the 
danger that using heuristic techniques to make decisions could lead to 
misjudgements. Listed below are some general heuristics: 
 Affect is the tendency to make decisions based on emotional 
responses. (Finucane et al., 2000) 
 Ambiguity effect implies that people tend to select options for 
which the probability of a favourable outcome is known, over an 
opportunity for which the likelihood of a favourable outcome is 
unknown (Ellsberg, 1961; Heath & Tversky, 1991). 
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 Anchoring is the tendency to hold on to a belief and base any future 
judgements on it as a reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 Availability is the tendency to rely heavily on events from memory. 
Since not all memory is available at any given time, this could lead to 
short-termism or salient event heavily distorting beliefs (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). 
 Default is the tendency to do nothing if there is a default option 
(Gigerenzer, 2008). 
 Representativeness is the tendency to decide on past information, 
disregarding current fundamental information (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). 
Conversely, a bias, generally, is a disproportionate probability placed in 
favour or against an idea or thing. As hinted by (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), a bias could cloud the judgement of market participants leading to 
the wrong decisions. According to (Ackert, Church & Deaves, 2003), there 
are two main types of biases: cognitive and emotional.  Cognitive biases 
refer to the limitation of any individual’s abilities to encode, process, and 
retrieve information. Identified by (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) as a critical 
behavioural factor influencing the decision-making process, common 
cognitive biases include: 
 Belief perseverance is the tendency to tightly hold on to a belief for 
too long despite the availability of new information to the contrary 
(Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979). 
 Cognitive dissonance is the tendency to feel discomfort when an 
action conflicts with the positive self-image (Festinger, 1962). 
 Confirmation is the tendencyto pay close attention to information 
that confirms their belief and ignore information that contradicts it 
(Wason, 1960). 
 Conservatism is the tendency to revise an opinion insufficiently 
when new information becomes available  (Edwards, 1982). 
 Disposition effect is the tendency to sell ‚winning‛ assets too early 
or hold on to  ‚losing‛ assets too long (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). 
 Experiential is the tendency to believe recent events are increasingly 
likely to occur again; it is an extension of the representativeness heuristic  
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 Familiarity refers to the tendency of buying familiar assets despite 
the advantages of diversification. (Heath & Tversky, 1991) show in a 
series of experiments that when people are faced with a choice between 
two gambles, they will pick the one that is more familiar to them. 
Moreover, they will sometimes pick the more familiar bet even if the 
odds of winning are lower! 
 Gambler’s fallacy is the erroneous belief that if a particular event 
occurs more(less) frequently than usual during the past, it is less(more) 
likely to happen in the future (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 Herd mentality refers to the tendency to follow and copy others 
(Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000). 
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 Hindsight is the tendency to believe they predicted the outcome of a 
past event before it occurred; equally, they could, also,  believe that they 
could forecast the future outcome (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). 
 Illusion of Control is the tendency for people to overestimate their 
ability to control events; for example, it occurs when someone feels a 
sense of control over outcomes that they demonstrably do not influence 
(Thompson, 1999). 
 Narrative fallacy refers to the tendency to let a good story cloud the 
decision-making process  (Taleb, 2008). 
 Self-attribution is the tendency to attribute success to personal skills 
and failure to external factors beyond their control (Miller & Ross, 1975). 
 Trend chasing is the tendency to chase past good performance on 
the belief that it will continue (Baker & Ricciardi, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Financial Cycle of Emotions 
 
As argued by (Ackert, Church & Deaves, 2003), behavioural economics 
has mainly concentrated on cognitive biases.  In contrast, emotional biases 
often refer to the inability of an individual to separate emotions from the 
decision-making process.  As stated by (Ackert, Church & Deaves, 2003), 
there is an agreement on the states of emotions: anger, hatred, guilt, regret, 
fear, pride, elation, joy and love. Moreover, as exemplified by (Ackert, 
Church & Deaves, 2003), emotional biases can significantly affect the 
decision-making process; furthermore, they can enhance the market 
participant’s ability to make rational decisions. There are many emotional 
biases; however, the fundamental biases concerning our model are as 
illustrated by Figure 4. 
1. Hoperefers to the tendency to feel that the ultimate goal is 
achievable or the event will transpire to the best. 
2. Overconfidence refers to the tendency to overweigh the subjective 
confidence relative to the objective accuracy of the judgement. In 
contrast, underconfidence is to underweigh the subjective confidence 
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relative to the objective accuracy of the decision. Although 
overconfidence is common, it is not universal (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). 
3. Denial refers to the tendency to repudiation or disavowal of aspects 
of external realitythe individual does not want to know about to 
diminish or avoid the painful effects associated with that reality 
(Auchincloss & Samberg, 2012). 
4. Regret is the tendency to harbour negative feelings as a result of 
comparing the real-world outcomes or state of events with those of an 
idealised world or an alternative better option.  However, as the old 
quote says: 
 
“Fear is only Temporary; Regret lasts Forever.” 
 
Intriguingly, of all the emotional states, two of the most prominently 
linked are the opposites scale emotions of fear and greed. As put by 
Bertrand Russell3 and Erich Fromm4 respectively: 
 
“Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanly or think 
sanely under the influence of fear.” 
‚Greed is a bottomless pit which exhausts the person in an endless effort to satisfy 
the need without ever reaching satisfaction.‛ 
 
As explained by (Lopes, 1987) and (Shefrin & Statman, 2000), fear is 
determined by an overweighing of the worst-case scenario probabilities 
relative to the best-case scenario; while greed is derived by an 
overweighing of the best-case scenario probabilities corresponding to the 
worst-case scenario.  
An essential element in any pricing uncertainty model over time is that 
price changes, in our model, we have theoretically divided the price 
changes into three areas, as illustrated by Figure 4: 
 Undervalued Price  
Below the fundamental value line, the price as determined by all the 
fundamental information of the asset as dictated by the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis, see (Fama, 1965) and  (Malkiel, 1962). 
 Price Adjustment 
The problem is that the price of any asset can deviate from the 
fundamental value by a significant amount over the short to long 
run. Essentially, as hinted by (De Bondt, 2000), the overreaction 
hypothesis states that sometimes market participants tend to 
disproportionately react to information (fundamentals and news) 
causing a temporarily and dramatic deviation from the fundamental 
value. Usually, the price does revert to the fundamental value 
within a short-medium period as market participants digest the 
information. 
 
3 Russell, B., (1950). Unpopular Esasays. NewYork, New York, USA: Simon and Schuster  
4 Fromm, E., (1941). Escape from Freedom. NewYork, New York, USA: Farrar & Rinehart 
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 Price Bubble 
Essentially, as hinted by (Barlevy, 2007), the popular notion is 
bubbles are initiated by rapid upwards pressures on the price of a 
particular type of asset or index in a short interval of time, 
eventually causing downward pressures to correct the price or more 
dangerously a collapse in the price. In simple terms, as hinted by 
(Blanchard & Watson, 1982), a popular notion defines a bubble as a 
significant price deviation from the fundamental value that is 
unjustified by the information available at the time. 
Conversely, an alternative argument is that the type and intensity of 
uncertainty dictates the actions of humans; in which case, there is a need to 
identify the uncertainty. Generally, uncertainty is when a person cannot 
assign a probability to an event or action, making any decision difficult. 
However, if this is the case, then any event or activity may be regarded as 
difficult. The difference is in the type and intensity, events such as Covid-19 
and Brexit were on a different platform to the uncertainty seen in ‚normal‛ 
market conditions. There are two types of uncertainty which are of interest 
here: 
 Black swan effect, an unpredictable event with significant 
consequences that in hindsight could have been predictable (Taleb, 2008) 
 Knightian uncertainty, a condition where the probabilities of a 
given situation cannot be determined and thus cannot be assigned to the 
asset (Knight, 1921). 
Further, during an event that invokes extreme uncertainty, the 
ambiguity on the financial market is likely to lead to the Ellsberg paradox. 
(Ellsberg, 1961) identified that humans tend to reject unknown in favour of 
known risks, even though the ambiguous option could lead to more 
substantial earnings. 
There are several assumptions influencing the model. The first 
assumption, as shown by Figure 1; the time-event conjuncture dictates that 
the impact of any event on market participants action diminishes with time. 
As suggested by (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973),  the availability heuristic 
dictates that humans only focus on the relevant information regarding the 
probabilities of events during the decision making process. Moreover, they 
often concentrate on the most recent developments; thus meaning that as 
events become older, they become less relevant to the decision-making 
process. Furthermore,  as hinted by (Smales, 2015),  the impact of news on 
investor sentiments diminishes over time.   
Additionally, since volatility is essentially the reaction of market 
participants to events; thus, another crucial factor is the distinction between 
volatility over the long and short-run. As advocated by (Pastor & 
Stambaugh, 2012) and (Engle & Lee, 1999), this means that market 
participants react significantly more in the short run than the long-run. 
Therefore, essentially hinting that the time-event conjuncture dictates as 
time moves forwards, the importance of an event diminishes as the 
epicentre for the decision making process. A new epicentre arises replacing 
the existing one.  
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The second assumption is that all significant crises impact the economic 
factors as illustrated by Figure 1.There is evidence from several research 
papers that all major events have an impact on the economy of a country. 
According to (Feldstein, 2009) and (Taylor, 2009), the global financial crisis 
had a significanteffect on the economy. Moreover, as stated by (Genschel & 
Jachtenfuchs, 2018) and (Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, 2016), the eurocrises 
had a significant impact on the economies of the Eurozone.  Additionally, 
as stated by (Fakhry et al., 2018), the Tohoku earthquake of 2011 had a 
substantial effect on the Japanese economy. Further, Brexit is likely to have 
a considerable impact on the UK’s economy as suggested by (Levell et al., 
2018) and (Hantzsche, Kara & Young, 2018). Lastly, as we will see later, 
there is mounting evidence that the Covid-19 pandemic is having a 
significant impact on the economy.  
The third assumption is probably the critical factor underpinning the 
model; according to (Mallard, 2016), many behavioural economics models 
separate between bounded rationalityas defined by (Simon, 1972) and the 
psychology of the actors as derived by (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We 
argue while this separation is perfectly reasonable, it does tend to secede 
between the reasoning of psychology and the elegant mathematical backing 
of bounded rationality.We argue that we need both treatments to 
understand the behaviour of actors in the global financial market.  
A vital factor is the concept of the fundamental price influencing the 
efficient market hypothesis. Since it is the actions of market participants 
that move the price; hence, the fundamental price is really the point of 
stability between the over and under reactions to the event or information. 
Conversely,  the fourth assumption is themodel dictatesthat the overall 
market price is the balanced reaction of the market participants. As hinted 
in Figure 1, at the primary level, the market price is determined by the 
reactions of the market participants. Hence, the price is the scale of the over 
and under reactions to any event or information. Thus, depending on the 
scale,  the price could be stable meaning that it is at the fundamental value 
or could lead to an overall overvaluation/undervaluation in the price.The 
overreaction/underreaction scalein Figure 1 is the stable market hypothesis 
which dictates that the reactions of the actors in the market determine the 
price of all assets.  
An essential factor in Figure 1 is the position of the stable market 
hypothesis (SMH), which dictates that the SMH is determining by the 
emotional and cognitive elements of the decision-making process. The fact 
that it is at the mouth of the bottom tier of our model is suggestive that 
many internal and external factors influence the SMH. Theoretically, 
market participants are influenced by the generalised context of the market 
at any given time; this has been proven by numerous events and actions of 
external and internal actors over time. The latest is  Covid-19 and the 
following activities of the government and public; which impacted on the 
behaviour of market participants as hinted by (Albulescu, 2020), (Baker et 
al., 2020a), (Corbet, Larkin & Lucey, 2020), (Ramelli & Wagner, 2020) and 
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(Zhang, Hu & Ji, 2020). The SMH is derived from a simple top-level 
equation as illustrated by Figure 1, which simply put is Equation 1.  
 
𝑅𝑆𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑂,𝑇 − 𝑆𝑆𝑈,𝑇 → 0         (1) 
Condition 1:  𝑅𝑆𝑇 ≫ 0, an overreaction 
Condition 2:  𝑅𝑆𝑇 ≪ 0, an underreaction 
 
Equation 1 simply states that the reaction of market participants in any 
given time is the deviation between the overreaction and underreaction to a 
given event or information depending on the emotional and cognitive 
behaviour. Thus, suggesting that as this deviation approaches zero, the 
price approaches the fundamental value at which the market is regarded as 
stable. However, if the market deviation is significantly negative or 
positive,meaning the market price is diverging from the fundamental 
value. Hence,the market is considered to be either underreactive or 
overreactive, respectively. 
 
3. A review of Covid-19  
In a BBC 2 Horizon Special on the Covid-19 shown on Tuesday, 19 May 
2020 at 21:00; Dr Chris van Tulleken pointed to several studies done as late 
as 2018 about the potential impact of a new coronavirus pandemic. These 
studies, such as (Afelt, Frutos & Devaux, 2018) and (Bailey et al., 2018), 
were warning of a new coronavirus pandemic with an epicentre of Eastern 
Asia. As stated by (Afelt, Frutos & Devaux, 2018, p.1) ‚The risk of emergence 
of a novel bat-CoV disease can therefore be envisioned‛. Furthermore, (Bailey et 
al., 2018, p.1), states ‚During the last two decades, scientists have grown 
increasingly aware that viruses are emerging from the human–animal 
interface‛.Moreover, as illustrated by Figure 5, the predicted location of the 
new coronavirus was central China based on historical cases. (Bailey et al., 
2018) warn that the complicated nature of these viruses requires 
coordination between all stakeholders. According to (Afelt, Frutos & 
Devaux, 2018), the increasing viral risk is not the result of a significant 
change in the biological problem; instead, a change in the environmental 
factors. Of which, the paramount consideration is deforestation in Asia, 
with an approximate 30% loss in forest area, according to (Afelt, Frutos & 
Devaux, 2018, p.2). Thus highlighting the issue, coronaviruses have a 
significantly increasing chance of spreading to humans in areas of reducing 
forests. 
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Figure 5. The Geographical of the Viruses (Bailey et al., 2018, p.2) 
 
According to (Afelt, Frutos & Devaux, 2018), a large proportion of the 
variants of coronaviruses start life in bats. However, with the possible 
exception of the Australian Bat Lyssavirus and Duvanhage virus; there is 
no clear, direct virus link between bats and humans. Thus, as stated by 
(Afelt, Frutos & Devaux, 2018), there is a high probability that the 
connection is via another animal. The increased deforestation activity is 
impacting on the landscape of the bats, which increases the chance of 
viruses jumping from bats to other species.  Moreover, as hinted by (Afelt, 
Frutos & Devaux, 2018), since deforestation brings animals and humans 
into connection; this increases the chance of species to human transmission 
of the coronavirus. 
As stated by (Bailey et al., 2018), coronaviruses are single-stranded 
ribonucleic acid viruses with large genome in which mutation are 
prevalent. According to (Bailey et al., 2018), there are six main variants of 
coronavirus, split into two effects: mild upper respiratory tract infections 
and severe acute respiratory syndrome (aka SARS). The Covid-19 is a 
member of the second group, SARS. According to (Bailey et al., 2018), the 
SARS variant emerged from the Guangdong Province, China, in 2003. 
However, according to the WHO, the total number of cases worldwide was 
8,098 with 774 deaths. According to (Bailey et al., 2018) and as indicated 
earlier, the SARS originally came from bats; however, the transmissions to 
humans was from other animals. Conversely, although there has been 
research to find a vaccine and, according to (Bailey et al., 2018), initial 
optimism pointed to a vaccine being ready for human clinical trials by 2017; 
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Figure 6. The Swine Flu (2009) Pandemic 
Global Map 
Figure 7. The Covid-19 Pandemic Global 
Map 
 
  The Covid-19 is the first pandemic to be genuinely global in over 
100years. The keyword being global, of course, there have been pandemics 
viruses before in the 21st century but none on this global scale. As 
illustrated by Figure 6 and Figure 7, the Swine flu pandemic was globally 
insignificant in comparison to the current Covid-19. Furthermore, the 
Swine Flu pandemic of 2009 had an R0 between 1.4 and 1.6; the current 
Covid-19 pandemic has an R0 of 2.0 to 2.5, according to (Coburn, Wagner & 
Blower, 2009) and (Kucharski et al., 2020) respectively. 
 
 
Figure 8. The Basic Structure of the 
Coronavirus (Zumla et al., 2016, p.330) 
Figure 9. Nature of Covid-19 (El 
Zowalaty and Järhult, 2020, p.4) 
 
The Covid-19 is a variant of the SARS-CoV meaning its basic structures 
is as illustrated by Figure 8.  As Figure 9 shows, Covid-19 is a high 
infectious zoonotic virus variant; thus, it is an animal to human 
transmittable virus. As described by (Zumla et al., 2016), the basic structure 
contains four main parts or proteins: spike glycoprotein (S), envelope 
protein (E), membrane protein (M) and nucleocapsid protein (N). 
According to (Zumla et al., 2016), the virus enters the body thru the 
respiratory system and into the lungs; once in the lungs, it takes over the 
cells. This invasion develops issues with the respiratory system workings, 
hence leading to the symptoms illustrated by  Figure 10 and described by 
(Rothan & Byrareddy, 2020) and (Sohrabi et al., 2020) including dry cough, 
fever and diarrhoea. 
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Figure 10. The Symptoms of Covid-19 (Rothan & Byrareddy, 2020, p.2) 
 
The danger is that Coronaviruses are highly reiterated viruses, hence the 
likelihood of a second wave during the Autumn/Winter of 2020/2021 is 
high.  As Dr Ranieri Guerra, WHO assistant director-general for strategic 
initiatives argues on 26 June 2020: ‚The comparison is with the Spanish Flu, 
which behaved exactly like Covid: it went down in the summer and fiercely 
resumed in September and October, creating 50 million deaths during the second 
wave.‛ Therefore, the real impact of Covid-19 will not be known until we 
developed an effective vaccine to stop the spread of the virus. 
 
A Review of the UK’s Covid-19 Response 
As argued by (Hale et al., 2020), the governments responses have varied 
substantially in the adoption and pace. However, the UK’s Covid-19 
response was to all observers is a ‚reactive‛ retort as identified by several 
studies such as (Cowper, 2020), (Hunter, 2020) and (Watkins, 2020).  
Moreover,  as stated by (Cowper, 2020), many criticised the UK’s 
government for being slow to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Additionally,  according to (Cowper, 2020), the official Covid-19 response 
was mix in the early stages of the pandemic. Furthermore, as hinted by 
(Cowper, 2020), the lack of communication from the UK’s government 
during the early stages was glaring, partially due to a mistrust towards the 
media since the 2019 general election. However, one key element during 
the Covid-19 pandemic was the change in the general public perspective 
towards ‚experts‛, as hinted by (Cowper, 2020). Conversely, as illustrated 
by Figure 11 and Figure 12, the UK had the highest total of Covid-19 cases 
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Figure 11. European Map Chart of Total 
Covid-19 Cases 
Source: European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control, Dated: 30/06/2020 
Figure 12.  European Map Chart of Total 
Covid-19 Deaths 
Source: European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control, Dated: 30/06/2020 
 
According to (Hale et al., 2020), the UK’s government was the third 
slowest to respond, among the observed European countries. Damningly, 
according to the statistics on government response stringency index by the 
Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; the UK was the 
slowest to implement stringent policies. Furthermore, that response came 
after the number of confirmed cases has reached 6,550 with 889 deaths on 
23 March 2020, which means that the UK’s government reacted stringently 
17 days after the first death as illustrated by Figure 13 and Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 13. UK Total Covid-19 Cases and 
Deaths, Source: European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control, Dated: 
30/06/2020 
Figure 14. UK Covid-19 Government 
Stringency Index and calculated 7-day R-
number, 
Sources:  Oxford COVID-19 Government 
Response Tracker (Blavatink School of 
Government) and   European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control, Dated: 
30/06/2020 
 
As hinted by (Hunter, 2020), the UK’s response in the early stages of the 
Covid-19 pandemic was a little too late. Moreover, as identified by (Hunter, 
2020), in the steps of the government response, there was no appetite for 
banning mass gathering. Many sporting events continued unhindered; it 
was left to the football authorities to postpone the matches until further 
notice. As stated by (Hunter, 2020), otherwise it was business as usual, 
despite the warnings from the medical profession as far back as the initial 
publication of data from China in January. The inaction was utterly out of 
step with almost every other European country; thus, according to (Hunter, 
2020, p.1),  the British government policy amounted to a ‚Keep Calm and 
Carry On‛ approach. This approach was believed to have come from the 
Turkish Economic Review 
B. Fakhry, TER, 7(4), 2020, p.214-265. 
232 
232 
advice of a group of behaviourist scientists. However, as noted by (Hunter, 
2020), it is thought that none of the government officials bothered asking 
does this advice account for a highly infectious virus.  
As stated by (Mahase, 2020), the UK’s government changed tactics when 
a study by Imperial College London5  showed that Intensive Care Unit 
requirements were approximately twice as initially thought under current 
government containment policies. The containment policy would have put 
enormous constraints on the ability of the NHS to operate and resulted in 
about 260,000 deaths. The study compared the government’s containment 
policy with a second policy involving social distancing of the entire 
population and tougher home isolation; the crucial factor is even under the 
second policy, the impact would still be far worst than expected, the study 
found. So in a reversal of policy, the government began a policy of social 
distancing and closed schools and universities by mid-March. 
According to (Iacobucci, 2020) and (Thornton, 2020), the UK’s 
government implemented a complete lockdown policy on 23 March 2020.  
As noted by (Iacobucci, 2020), most doctors and scientists supported the 
lockdown policy as a crucial step to saving lives. In announcing the 
procedure, the prime monster said the population must stay at home unless 
they work to an essential service, shop for essentials, exercise twice a day 
and access medical care. Also announcing that the closure of non-essential 
shops; following on from the announcement that gyms, restaurants and 
bars are to close for the foreseeable future in the previous week  As alluded 
by (Thornton, 2020), the impact on the NHS of the lockdown was positive.  
The issue at the heart of the dilemma facing the UK’s government is that 
the first option, herd immunity, would cost lives and the second option, 
lockdown, would be costly for the economy as suggested by (Sibony, 2020). 
We will go into the economic facts in the next sub-section; however, 
according to (Sibony, 2020),  the financial cost would be roughly a three 
base point reduction in the GDP per month. However, this would pale into 
insignificant on a moral stand against the impact on the NHS and death 
rate, as reported earlier by the Imperial College London study. As hinted 
by (Sibony, 2020), in the absence of a medical treatment, any government 
has only one option to slow down the Covid-19 progression, which is 
changing the everyday behaviour of the population. Yet changing the daily 
routine is a tall order, especially in a fully-fledged democracy where 
freedom of movement is a fundamental right, such as the UK. Yet 
according to an opinion poll by Opinium for The Observer on 3 May 2020,  
4 in 5 thought the lockdown should continue. Furthermore, according to 
polls conducted by Deltapoll and Ipsos MORI in late April, 66 per cent of 
the general public believed that the lockdown policy should have been 
earlier.  
Continuing,  according to (Cowper, 2020), the support among the 
general public for the government’s response during the Covid-19 was not 
favourable. As indicated by an opinion poll in the third week of February 
 
5 the MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis 
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showed a drop from 63% to 50% approval for the government Covid-19 
policies. Moreover, a poll by Opinium in the Observer indicates that the 
general public believes only the US has done worse than the UK during the 
Covid-19 pandemic.  
Of course, according to (Brodeur et al., 2020), there are other costs to 
consider other than the economic: governmental trust, educational 
disruption and population well-being. (Brodeur et al., 2020)  analysed the 
welfare of nine western European countries and US states using data from 
Google Trend pre and ex lockdown, they also used the same analysis over 
the same period in 2019 to account for seasonal changes. They found 
people’s mental health may have been severely affected by the lockdown. 
The result shows a substantial increase in searches with the words 
boredom and worry, which does not decrease with time. However, 
according to (Brodeur et al., 2020), the effect on the well-being depends on 
the timing of the lockdown. The countries, including the UK, which entered 
lockdown at a later date experienced a positive impact on the well being. 
However, the countries which entered lockdown early experienced a 
negative effect on the well being. Therefore, negativity seems to increase 
with time. 
 
4. A Review of the economic factors influencing the 
UK’s financial market during the Covid-19 pandemic 
Firstly, we need to review the impact of Covid-19 on the UK’s economy.  
Since, as stated by (Chen, Roll & Ross, 1986) and (Birz & Lott, 2011), 
financial markets are influenced by economic factors and news. Moreover, 
as hinted by (Baker et al., 2020a) and (Anoushiravani et al., 2020), the Covid-
19 pandemic is highly likely to have an impact on the economy. Hence, we 
need to understand this effect to appreciate the implications of Covid-19 on 
the financial market fully.  
Before we review the impact of Covid-19, we need to address the 
elephant in the room: the potential impact of Brexit on the UK’s economy. 
In the past few years, the big question has been what are the consequences 
of Brexit on the UK’s economy. Moreover, the impact depends on whether 
there is a trade deal or not. According to (Hantzsche, Kara & Young, 2018), 
the proposed agreement of Mrs May’s government would have cost the UK 
3.0 per cent in GDP/head by 2030 relative to the UK staying in the EU. The 
deal proposed by the EU, which included the backstop would have cost the 
UK 1.9 per cent in GDP/head by 2030 against staying. However, (Levell et 
al., 2018) differ slightly with GDP/head loss of 1.7% in the long run against 
staying for Mrs May’s deal. According to (Bevington et al., 2019), Mr 
Johnson’s government deal would mean the UK would be 0.8 per cent 
worse off in terms of GDP/head than Mrs May’s deal. The fallout from the 
Covid-19 pandemic comes against this economic backdrop, which partly 
explains the somewhat mixed and delayed reaction of the UK’s 
government to the pandemic. 
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Figure 15. Daily Economic Policy Uncertainty in  the UK6 
 
So how did a health issue morph into an economic crisis? According to 
(Ozili & Arun, 2020), the answer lies in two pivotal factors thru-which 
coronavirus stifle economic activity. Firstly, to prevent the virus from 
spreading, a lockdown policy had to be enforced. Secondly, the exponential 
rate of infection heightened uncertainty. As illustrated by Figure 15, the 
levels of economic policy uncertainty during the Covid-19 pandemic 
reached over 1,500; a scale only witnessed on three previous occasions 
during the Brexit and war on terror episodes. This level of uncertainty 
displays the real impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the UK’s economic 
policy. As implied by (Baker et al., 2020b), during the Covid-19 pandemic, 
more than half of the loss in GDP is likely to be due to Covid-induced 
uncertainty. Moreover, as stated by (Fernandes, 2020), the danger is in 
comparing the Covid-19-induced recession to other recessions in the post-
war era; the economic downturn is in essence a double shock to demand 
and supply. Additionally, according to (Fernandes, 2020),  Covid-19 could 
potentially be the most significant impact on the global economy. 
Furthermore, as argued by (Ozili & Arun, 2020), the drivers of the 
negative effect of Covid-19 on the global economy are fear and uncertainty. 
Conversely, according to (Wren-Lewis, 2020), the most significant impact 
on GDP is likely to come due to fear forcing many people to reduce social 
consumption. Therefore, hinting at the lockdown policies being a 
substantial hit on the economy. Furthermore, as implied by (Wren-Lewis, 




6 Obtained from [Retrieved from]. on 31st May 2020 
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Figure 16. Impact of lockdown  policy during Covid-19  
Source: (Fernandes, 2020) 
 
According to (Fernandes, 2020), a global recession is almost inevitable; 
the IMF and OECD forecast a 0.1 and 2.9 per cent loss in GDP, respectively. 
Yet, as suggested by (Fernandes, 2020), both these forecasts underestimate 
the impact. (Fernandes, 2020) alludes for varying effects depending on the 
government policies. For the UK, the consequences is a step ladder varying 
with the length of the lockdown as illustrated by Figure 16. However, 
according to (McKibbin & Fernando, 2020), the factors influencing the 
impact are the severity of the Covid-19 (low, medium or high) and nature 
of the shock (temporary or permanent). Given that the Covid-19 is now a 
pandemic, we will only review scenarios 4 to 7 of (McKibbin & Fernando, 
2020)7. Conversely, the cost to the UK’s GDP by Covid-19 as estimated by 
(McKibbin and& Fernando, 2020) ranges from 1.2 to 6.0 per cent. As 
illustrated by Figure 17, the UK’s GDP could be affected by 6.0 per cent in a 
highly severe infection rate. Conversely, as of writing the paper, the UK 
had the worst infection rate.  
 
 
Figure 17. Covid-19 severity levels impact on GDP  
Source: (McKibbin & Fernando, 2020) 
 
7 Scenarios: 4 (Low, Temporary), 5 (Medium, Temporary), 6 (High, Temporary) and 7 (Low, 
Permanent) 
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In a weekly report by Price Waterhouse Cooper8 on 27 May 2020, the 
impact on GDP was forecast to be -7.1 to –13 per cent. Towards the end of 
2021, GDP will only be 93.0 - 98.5 per cent of the pre-Covid-19 trend. 
Furthermore, the budget deficit in 2020/2021 is forecasted to be around 15 – 
22 per cent of GDP falling to 5 - 10 per cent of GDP during the fiscal year 
2021/2022. According to the report, the macroeconomics data paints an 
economic picture previously seen during the global financial crisis of 
2007/2009. Additionally, a report by the Office for National Statistics in the 
UK on the impact of Covid-19 on the economy9 backs this trend pointing to 
a 5.8% fall in GDP during March 2020, the most significant monthly fall.  
 
 
Figure 18. UK Monthly GDP Index Change (02/1997-04/2020) 
 
On 12 June 2020, the Office for National Statistics in the UK reported the 
monthly GDP index to be at 78.9 for April 2020, a fall of 20.38% on the 
previous month. Moreover, March 2020 saw a fall of 5.89%; as illustrated by 
Figure 18, even the March fall was worse than any on record. These GDP 
statistics point to the impact being much worse than the worst-case 
scenario predicted by many economic organisations and economists. 
Furthermore, the macroeconomics data seem to be hinting at a worst 
impact on the UK’s economy than the global financial crisis which shrank 
the economy by 5.92% during the period between May 2008 and March 
2009. It says a lot when you consider that in just two months during the 
pandemic the economy has shrunk by 25.07%. A look at Table 1 illustrates 
the wide-ranging effect of Covid-19 on the UK’s economy. Apart from the 






8COVID-19 UK Economic Update, Source: [Retrieved from].  
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Table 1. Monthly Change in GDP Components Growth 
Components February2020 March2020 April2020 
Index of Services 0.0% -6.2% -19.0% 
Index of Production -0.1% -4.2% -20.3% 
Manufacturing 0.3% -4.6% -24.3% 
Construction -2.1% -5.9% -40.1% 
Agriculture -0.1% -0.2% -5.5% 
 
4.1. A Review of the UK Economic Policy Response during Covid-
19 
The impact of fiscal and monetary policies on the financial markets has 
been studied by many in recent years due to the global financial crises with 
varying results. As (Mishkin, 2009) hints, many have argued that 
conventional monetary policy does not work duringsignificant economic 
crises. However, the keyword here is conventional; according to (Blinder, 
2010), a mixture of unconventional monetary policies do work in providing 
liquidity and thus reducing risks. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Bank 
of England went with a combination of conventional and unconventional 
monetary policies. The Bank of England in the role of regulator ‚advised‛ 
banks to forgo their dividends and bonuses policies during the Covid-19 
pandemic. As reported by the Bank of England, there were several 
monetary policy responses to the Covid-19 economic impact: 
 A reduction of the Bank Rate from 0.75% to 0.25% 
 Maintaining the £435 billion quantitative easing policy 
 Introducing a new funding scheme for small and medium-size firms 
thru commercial bank 
 Cancellation of 2020 annual stress testing regulation to assist major 
market participants 
 Postponing or adapting of several supervisory programs to enable 
financial institutions to focus on the implications of the Covid-19 
pandemic 
As highlighted by (Fakhry, 2018), at the heart of the argument on fiscal 
stimulus policies that have been raging for ages are two related issues: cost 
and impact.  A key factor highlighted by the recent financial crisis is that 
the fiscalstimulus policies are costly. As (Tobin, 1971, p.91) states: 
‚How is it possible that society can merely by the device of incurring 
debt to itself can deceive itself into believing that it is wealthier? Do 
not the additional taxes which are necessary to carry the interest 
charges reduce the value of other components of private wealth?‛ 
Hence, a key argument is in the long run; the burden of debt is likely to 
be exceedingly high. However, as (Keynes, 1923, p.80) argues: 
‚But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long 
run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a 
task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the 
storm is long past the ocean is flat again.‛ 
Keynes was hinting that the benefits of the short-run impact of a 
stimulus policy far outweigh the costs in the long run, if the economy is in 
such a dire state. In a pandemic where the infectious rate is high, and no 
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medical cure is available; the government had no options but to enact the 
health policies described earlier at a massive cost to the economy. 
According to the Centre for Regulatory Strategy at Deloitte10, the  response 
of Her Majesty’s Treasury consisted of the following fiscal policies: 
 Covid-19 Business Interruption Loan Scheme for small to large 
businesses 
 Statutory sick pay (SSP) for SMEs (allow SMEs to reclaim SSP for 
Covid-19 affected employees) 
 Covid-19 extension and enhancement for Time to Pay arrangements 
(allows UK businesses time and flexibility on taxes due)  
 Support for businesses that pay little to no business rates 
 Covid Corporate Financing Facility 
 Grants for retail, hospitality and leisure businesses 
 Covid-19 Job Retention Scheme (pays up to 80% to a maximum of 
£2,500 of employee salary furloughed due to Covid-19 policies) 
 Rate reliefs for all property occupiers in the retail, leisure and 
hospitality  business sector 
 Deferral of income tax and VAT payments  
 Self-employed income support 
 Bounce back loan scheme 
These government fiscal stimulus policies in conjunction with lower 
fiscal revenues will mean a significant impact on the deficit and inevitably 
debt of the UK’s government. The elephant in the room is the upcoming 
economic impact of Brexit in the next few years. 
 
4.2. A Review of the Covid-19 Impact on Consumers 
As advocated by (Leland, 1968) and (Sandmo, 1970) amongstmany 
others, the precautionary savings theory dictates that as uncertainty 
regarding income increases; the household reacts by increasing savings and 
decreasing consumption.  However, there is an argument put forward by 
(Malley & Moutos, 1996), that precautionary saving is also dictated by 
unemployment, meaning any rise in the unemployment rate leads to an 
increase in savings. Moreover, a key factor to consider is the possible 
impact of a decrease in personal net wealth due to a loss in the value of 
investments or property. This decrease in personal wealth has the effect of 
raising loss aversion and hence further increasing precautionary savings. 
As (Spilimbergo et al., 2011) and (Aizenman & Noy, 2015) indicate, there 
was evidence of precautionary savings during the recent global financial 
crises.  Further, as highlighted by (Li, 2020) and (Abay, Tafere & 
Woldemichael, 2020), the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the economy 
is partly due to the lockdown policies but also precautionary savings on the 
household side. Conversely, according to a weekly report by 
PriceWaterhouseCooper on the impact of Covid-19 on the UK’s  economy11, 
there are three factors impacting consumers: 
 
10Source: [Retrieved from].  
11 [Retrieved from]. on 4th June 2020 
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 Lockdown policy 
 Increase in unemployment  
 Increase in precautionary savings 
 
 
Figure 19. UK Average Weekly Regular Earnings - Seasonally Adjusted 
Source: ONS. 
 
According to (Keynes, 1936), consumption increases with disposable 
income, thus meaning that consumption also decreases with disposable 
income. However, as argued by (Friedman, 1957), consumption does not 
merely depend on current disposable income, consumers also account for 
expected future revenue. Additionally, as highlighted by (Friedman, 1957), 
consumption is not only determined by the current disposable income but 
also by other assets, such as: physical (property), financial (equity and 
bonds) and human (education and experience). Thus meaning, as 
(Arellano, Blundell & Bonhomme, 2017) and (Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2010), 
hints any income shock would impact consumption. Hence, as  (Leland, 
1968) and (Sandmo, 1970) argue, the precautionary saving theory dictates 
that during highly uncertain times where future income or wealth could be 
negatively affected, or unemployment is a rising factor; consumers tend to 
save more. Therefore, reducing their expenditure.  As  illustrated by Figure 
19 and the next section, Covid-19 had a double negative impact of 
heightened income uncertainty and reduced financial assets values which 
affected the consumers’ wealth   
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Figure 20. UK Retail Sales Volume - Seasonally  Adjusted 
Source: ONS. 
 
The reduction in consumption due to the Covid-19 pandemic meant a 
decrease in retail sales. According to the ONS, retail sales fell from an index 
of 114.00 in February 2020 to 87.1 in April 2020, a reduction of 23.6%. 
Additionally, as illustrated by Figure 20, this reduction far greater and 
intense than any other since record began. The double impact of 
precautionary savings and the lockdown policy during the Covid-19 
pandemic affected the retailers. And although there was an improvement 
in May 2020 as the effect began to ease, yet many businesses may go into 
administration over the next fewmonths; which may feedback into the 
precautionary savings theory. This feedback effect could trigger a 
downwards spiralwith the added impact of Brexit during the next few 
months.  
Even without a second wave of the Covid-19, the global economic status 
is dire. The problem is that many organisations have suffered a massive 
impact on their financial situation during the lockdown. Therefore, many 
may not be able to operate as before the Covid-18 pandemic. Moreover, 
many organisations may file for bankruptcy. This situation would have the 
effect of increasing unemployment; consequently, increasing the consumer 
income and wealth uncertainty and hiking the precautionary saving 
leading to a reduction in consumption. Therefore, leading to a vicious 
downwards economic spiral without accounting for the Brexit impact.  
 
5. A review of the Covid-19 impact on the equity 
market 
According to (Ramelli & Wagner, 2020), infectious diseases were ranked 
the tenth worst impact in the Global Risk Report by the World Economic 
Forum published on 15 January 2020 and were considered quite unlikely. 
Most investors were concerned with the traditional risk factors plus the 
environment. Yet, just a few months later, Covid-19 was characterised as a 
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global pandemic and hence realisation of the severe worldwide economic 
consequences. Thus, highlighting the unexpected impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic on the global financial markets. As highlighted by (Ramelli & 
Wagner, 2020), under a global pandemic with a high infectious rate; both 
policy responses and individual behaviours were unknown factors. 
Additionally, as hinted by (Ramelli & Wagner, 2020), the question is 
whether the combination of ongoing policy intervention and changing 
individual behaviour will stabilise the financial market or make it 
increasingly volatile. At the heart of this issue is the fact that market 
participants will be wary of any evidence of a resurgence in the Covid-19 
pandemic. 
Conversely, as argued by (Yarovaya, Matkovskyy & Jalan, 2020), the 
nature of the Covid-19 crisis is debatable. From a purely pandemic view, 
Covid-19 could be regarded as a black swan event; there has been no health 
event that had the same global impact on the economy and financial 
markets. Moreover, (Baker et al., 2020a) found that previous infectious 
disease outbreaks, even the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918-1920, which 
killed an estimated 2% of the global population, had little impact on market 
volatility. However, the 1957 influenza pandemic, which killed between 1 
and 2 million globally, did affect the US equity market with the Dow Jones 
registering a fall of 15% during the second half of 1957. Although, some of 
the impact of the 1957 influenza pandemic on the equity market may be 
attributed to other events.   In sharp contrast to the effect of Covid-19 on 
the equity market; according to (Baker et al., 2020a), the US equity market 
registered 22 Covid-19 related hikes in volatility between 24 February 2020 
and 24 March 2020. Nevertheless, as argued by (Yarovaya, Matkovskyy & 
Jalan, 2020), from a crisis view, there have been many events which had 
triggered similar global effects on the economy and financial markets (e.g. 
1929 Wall Street crash and 2008 financial crisis). However, as stated by  
(Baker et al., 2020a), the Covid-19 surge in volatility is the third-highest on 
observation, higher than the great depression of the early 1930s and global 
financial crisis of the late 2000s.  As hinted by (Baker et al., 2020a),  there are 
three main contributory factors: 
 Severity and infectious of the Covid-19 pandemic 
 News and information regarding Covid-19 pandemic is much more 
abundant and regular in comparison with the Spanish Flu pandemic 
 The global economy is more interconnected than under previous 
global pandemics 
According to (Ali, Alam & Rizvi, 2020). the changing impact on the 
global financial market is highlighted by the transformation from an 
epidemic to a pandemic. The spread of Covid-19 from China to the US via 
Europe meant an increasingly volatile global financial market. As hinted by 
(Ali, Alam & Rizvi, 2020), unlike China, the global markets were 
increasingly conscious of the spread of Covid-19, and it’s impact on the 
worldwide economy. Moreover, according to (Ashraf, 2020),  the highly 
volatile global financial market owe just as much to international 
governments responses, both healthwise and economical, as to the Covid-
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19 announcements. However, the effect of Covid-19 announcements 
deviate with the type, the market perception to the number of deaths 
recorded is not as significant as the number of new cases. Moreover, this 
perception tends to vary with time andeconomic projection. 
Additionally, as illustrated by (Zhang, Hu & Ji, 2020), Covid-19 had a 
strong influenced on equity markets. As suggested by (Zhang, Hu & Ji, 
2020), long-term expectations cannot explain such a strong impact; it is 
almost sure that emotional factors played a critical role during the Covid-19 
effect on the financial markets. The initial sentimental response by market 
participants to the global Covid-19 outbreak would generate an 
amplification effect thru social and news media which would cause 
extreme downwards pressures on the pricing of financial assets. The 
announcement on 11 March 2020 by the WHO, officially declaring Covid-
19 as a pandemic had a significant impact on market participants 
behaviours and hence the global financial market.Furthermore, as stated by 
(Albulescu, 2020) and (Liu et al., 2020), the relationship between the 
emotion of fear and the Covid-19 statistic announcements was the driving 
force in the global financial market. There is a positive correlation between 
the death ratio and the VIX. Additionally, an increase in the number of 
affected countries leads to a rise in financial volatility. Thus, hinting at fear 




Figure 21. The Covid-19 Uncertainty Behavioural Factor Model 
 
The general uncertainty behavioural factor modelcould be extended to 
demonstrate the Covid-19 pandemic effect on the UK’s financial market, as 
illustrated by Figure 21 The impact of the actors and external factors have 
been discussed in the previous sections; hence in this section, we will 
concentrate on the behavioural factors influencing the market participants’ 
reactions during the Covid-19 pandemic. Thus, as illustrated by Figure 21, 
the model dictates that the final two layers describe the behavioural factors 
and reactions of the market participants. As illuminated by Figure 21 in 
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explaining the behavioural factors, we need to understand the heuristics 
and biases influencing the emotional and cognitive aspects of the decision-
making process during the Covid-19 pandemic. Conversely, the influencing 
factor in the Covid-19 pandemic is the rarity of such an event, as (Yarovaya, 
Matkovskyy & Jalan, 2020) and (Baker et al., 2020a) highlight, which makes 
rational decisions increasingly tricky. Hence, the need for heuristics to 
make investment decision. 
A critical factor during the Covid-19 pandemic is the market participants 
perspective on losses and their reactions. Part of the explanation relies on 
the prospect theory of (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). It is worth noting that 
the prospect theory dictates that market participants are more sensitive to 
losses than to gains of similar magnitudes. However, a significant 
behavioural effect influencing the prospect theory come into play during 
the Covid-19 pandemic crisis: certainty. During the Covid-19 pandemic 
crisis, it is plausible to assume that market participants tended to 
increasingly underweighuncertainty, hinting at disinvestment in assets 
effected by the pandemic crisis. As noted previously, the prospect theory 
relies on several fundamental behavioural traits which came into play 
during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis: 
 Reference dependence 
It is safe to assume that many market participants used the price 
before the initial date of the pandemic as the reference price. So they 
evaluated their losses based on a pre-pandemic reference point; the 
argument is that the pandemic crisis changed the environment. 
Therefore, the reference point no longer existed. Assuming that 
many may have invested in a lower price than the reference point, 
thus they could have made a profit during the Covid-19 pandemic 
crisis. However, this would have been a loss in their eyes because of 
the reference point.  
 Endowment effect 
Many market participants exhibited an illusion of control bias 
which meant they demanded more than they wanted to pay mainly 
due to the high reference point. During the Covid-19 pandemic 
crisis, the danger was that such behaviour would lead to losses. 
 Loss Aversion 
During the early parts of the Covid-19 pandemic, market 
participants were reacting to the number of countries infected by 
the virus, as stated by (Albulescu, 2020). As the pandemic spread 
globally, market participants became increasingly loss averse; 
hence, market prices began to fall.  
Moreover, the policies enacted by global governments to slow down the 
spread of the virus meant that macroeconomics indicators and assets’ 
fundamentals were weakened. This weakening doubled the impact on the 
financial markets leading to an increase in loss aversion. However, as 
Figure 21 and (Zhang, Hu & Ji, 2020) illustrates this increase in loss 
aversion led to the amplification mechanism, which simply dictates that 
when faced with losses on a holding position, market participants tend to 
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sell the other assets in the hope that they could cover their losses. Thus 
leading to further losses and hence the loss spiral meaning financial assets 
which were unaffected by the Covid-19 crisis were now affected.  
 
The Impacts of Cognitive Behavioural Factors during the Covid-19 Pandemic 
It must be noted that heuristics are cognitive techniques used by many 
to simplify the daily workload. As hinted by Figure 21, there are several 
heuristics which could explain the behaviour of the market participants 
during the Covid-19 pandemic: 
 Affect 
As we have maintained throughout, the Covid-19 pandemic had a 
psychological effect on many. Conversely, this effect was evidenced 
throughout the period; we suspect that many market participants 
may have been affected byemotional issues. Moreover, the impact of 
the affect heuristic could explain the irrational pricing of some 
equities throughout the crisis.  Hence, as hinted by (Albulescu, 2020) 
and (Zhang, Hu & Ji, 2020), the sentimental feelings towards the 
Covid-19 pandemic affected the pricing and volatility of the asset. 
 Ambiguity  
As hinted by (Ramelli & Wagner, 2020), there were a lot of 
unknown factors influencing the global financial markets during the 
Covid-19 pandemic.  Key among these unknown factors are: 
 The precise structure of the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrom Coronavirus 2, making it challenging to be optimistic 
about a vaccine or drug to control it. 
 The true extent of the global infection rate 
 The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on governmental 
policies and individual behaviours 
 The true extent of the impact of Covid-19 policies, such as 
lockdown, on the economy and organisations’ finances 
Hence, market participants may have displayed ambiguity 
aversion during the pandemic. This display of ambiguity aversion 
was highlighted by the significant drop in share prices of many 
fundamentally strong companies in the early days of the impact. A 
critical factor to the continued market participant’s behaviours is the 
ambiguity regarding the possible resurgence of the virus.  
 Availability  
In the absence of any recent global pandemics, many people will 
rely on the memory of events which had a similar effect in 
comparison. The critical factor when it comes to pandemics is that 
many people remember seeing the deaths in past pandemics events 
such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemics; however, very few remember 
the actual facts. Another crucial factor is that many will recall 
hearing about historical pandemics events such as the Spanish Flu 
of the late 1910s, a variant of the H1N1 virus, and more recently 
1957 influenza, a variant of the H2N2 virus. These two factors 
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would affect the perspective of the people view on the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
Moreover, another factor of note is that impact of recent uncertain 
events on the economy. The recent global financial crises had a 
significant effect on the worldwide economy; many people will tend 
to relate the economic impact of the global financial crisis to the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the prospective impact of the 
ongoing Brexit process, as highlighted earlier, will be fresh on the 
minds of many. 
 Default 
Many market participants usually have two alternating defaults: 
during economics upturns where markets exhibit bullish conditions, 
the default setting is often set to buying risky high return assets. 
However, during economic downturns such as the Covid-19 
pandemic, the default setting is usually set to selling risky assets in 
favour of safe-havens. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the mindset 
of the market participants may have been set to a negative default 
setting, which means that market participants were neglecting 
fundamentally strong assets in favour of safe-haven assets just 
because they were perceived as risky during these unprecedented 
times. 
 Representativeness 
As stated previously, the elephant in the room was the potential 
impact of Brexit on the UK’s economy. During the early parts of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, market participants were focused on the Brexit 
implications, disregarding the effects of the pandemic on the 
economy and fundamental information. So it was not surprising 
that the pricing of financial assets followed the trend of the Brexit 
process rather than the pandemic. It was not until after Covid-19 
was declared a pandemic by the WHO, and the UK’s government 
was forced to take more stringent measures to slow down the 
infectious rate, that market participants began to consider the 
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic more seriously. 
As pointed by Figure 21 we introduce three new heuristics to explain the 
reaction ofmarket participants during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
 Political effect is the tendency for actions or inactions of 
policymakers to influence the decision-making process of the market 
participants. 
The policy effect dictates the action or inaction of policymakers has 
the potential of hiking fear among market participants. As 
illustrated previously, during the early stages of the pandemic, the 
limited actions or practically inaction of the UK’s government 
amounted to a ‚Keep Calm and Carry On‛ approach. This approach 
may have been the explanation for the behaviour ofmarket 
participants during the early stages of the pandemic. However, as 
the UK’s government began to put into action policies that would 
stop the spread of the virus, the actions of the government 
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heightened the fear levels. Mainly due to the impact of such policies 
on the economy. However, there is another factor in play; the 
dramatic government change of plan had the effect of inducing 
fears that the government got its policies badly wrong and may 
have underestimated the impact. Hence this factor may have raised 
the fear levels of the market participants. 
Another critical factor is the Bank of England pressurising the 
banks to delay or stop the payments of dividends to shareholders, 
hence giving the impression that the banks may have capital issues 
during the pandemic. Moreover, it also reflects the idea that the 
Bank of England thinks the economy will be severely affected, given 
the ‚advice‛ that the banks should use the capital to help the 
economy. Thus, making market participants fearful of investing in 
assets with a strong affinity to the UK’s economy. 
A possible reactive impactoften associated with political 
association effect is many people tend to link different policies, e.g. 
economic, with distinct political parties. In term of this research, the 
critical link is the Conservatives party with Brexit and economic 
prudence and stringency. Both linkages were central to the 
Conservatives winning the last four general elections.  
Hence, there is a strong argument for both linkages; yet as the 
Covid-19 pandemic has illustrated, there are no political 
associations when it comes to a significant economic crisis. 
However, Brexit had been the key policy for the Conservatives since 
the EU referendum of 2016. Hence, any u-turn or delay will signal a 
massive backlash from the population. Bearing this in mind, the 
market participants are pricing for a possible double impact of a 
second surge in the Covid-19 pandemic and the economic fallout 
from Brexit. This dual impact on the economy has the potential to 
lead to further austerity fiscal policy in the future since any 
Conservative government would want to preserve their economic 
integrity above all else.Given the association with economic 
prudence and the fact that the Conservatives have just recently 
being voted in with a vast majority, market participants are 
likelypricing any future austerity fiscal policies into the price of the 
assets.  Hence, essentially meaning that the political effect heuristic 
plays a significant role in the behaviour of market participants. 
 Media Effect is the tendency to associate extreme events with TV 
programmes or films. 
One possible explanation for the emotional and cognitive 
behaviour is the effect of past movies and TV programmes with 
epidemic/pandemic content. Over the years, it has been 
demonstrated that the content of media such as films or tv shows 
can influence behaviour. Many people link certain events to movies 
or tv programmes to help them ‚understand the facts‛.  
Given that the Covid-19 pandemic is regarded as a Black Swan 
event; there is no real event that people, generally, andmarket 
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participants, in particular, can easily relate to the Covid-19 
pandemic. Therefore, a possible explanation is that many people 
were comparing the Covid-19 pandemic to a movie or TV show. 
Additionally, the media links to historical events such as the 1918 
Spanish Fluand 1957 influenza pandemics would have affected 
many.  The media effect heuristic may have translated into the 
initial impact on the global financial markets as Covid-19 was 
declared a pandemic. The reality would slowly replace the media 
effect heuristic as the information on the pandemic and 
governments reaction filtered into the markets. 
 Brexit Effectis the tendency to concentrate on Britain's exit of the EU 
disregarding all other information or events. 
Partly due to the affinity of Brexit in terms of the event-time 
conjuncture but mainly due to the amplified effect on all aspects of 
British lives, economics and politics; Brexit has a significant impact 
on the decision making process of market participants. Brexit is the 
most significant change in the economics and political arenas since 
the UK originally joined the EU in 1973. The irony is that both these 
historic and momentous events involved the EU.   
As highlighted earlier, the economic impact of Brexit is unknown 
with a range of -3% to -4% of GDP relative to staying in the EU, 
according to the latest statistics from (Hantzsche & Young, 2020). 
The potential economic impact of Brexit was the critical factor in the 
decision-making process during the early and later stages of the 
Covid-19 pandemic in the UK. The Covid-19 pandemic amplified 
the issues facing the UK’s economy in both the short and long runs, 
which led to the market participants pricing the uncertainties and 
risks into the assets with the most affinity to the UK’s economy. This 
double impact of Brexit and Covid-19 pandemic on the economy 
may have had a significant effect on the market participants view of 
some financial assets in the UK. 
 Mutate  
Generally, a bias is a disproportionate probability placed in favour 
or against an investment clouding the judgement of market 
participants. The cognitive bias limits the market participant’s 
ability to deal with the information rationally. Figure 21 hints at 
market participants being critically affected byfourcognitive biases 
during the Covid-19 pandemic: 
 Conservatism 
To be fair, it could be said that during the early months of the 
Covid-19 pandemic most people, let alone market participants,  
were unaware of the potential impact of the virus. It was not until 
the Covid-19 pandemic reached Europe in late February early 
March that most people began to pay attention to the pandemic. The 
11 March 2020 WHO declaration promoting Covid-19 to pandemic 
status could be regarded as the critical moment in the awareness of 
the potential impact. However, the fact that the virus had already 
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infected more than 80,000 globally and was spreading fast across the 
world by 29 February 2020 plus a vaccine was not likely for another 
2 years, probably should have alerted the market participants of the 
potential impact. Furthermore, the evidence from China and many 
others in Asia of the economic effect of the Covid-19 pandemic 
should have also alerted the market participants of the economic 
crisis associated with the pandemic. Yet the FTSE 100 remained over 
7,000 until 26 February 2020. This evidence seems to be pointing at 
market participants displaying conservatism behaviour in the 
pricing of assets.  However, a possible explanation could be the 
reduction in uncertainty surrounding Brexit at the time, which 
could have stabilised the equity market. 
An alternative view on the conservatism bias during the Covid-19 
pandemic was the low price adjustments of shares with sound 
fundamentals. An influential factor underlining this view was the 
significant impact on the general economics of the country, as 
highlighted earlier. Like any other significant economic crisis, the 
Covid-19 pandemic could have created downward pressures on the 
company due to the general economic status, even though the 
company’s fundamentals were sound. 
 Disposition effect 
As market participants became increasingly aware of the 
pandemic effect on the economy and hence financial markets, they 
became increasingly loss averse. During uncertain periods, such as 
the Covid-19 pandemic, it is common practice for market 
participants to sell winning shares too early and hold on to losing 
shares too long in the hope of maybe regaining their money. 
Another explanation is that the Covid-19 pandemic had a significant 
impact on the economy and financial positions of many companies, 
which had the effect of market participants assuming that most 
companies would be affected. This fear would get amplified to 
many financially healthy and winning shares. 
 Herd mentality 
It must be noted that in the animal kingdom, an attack by a wolve 
or big cat would generate such a forward momentum that the herd 
don’t know when to stop and fail to spot the cliff, hence fall to their 
death. In the absence of any real information and certainty on the 
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, market participants were 
exhibiting this kind of herd mentality. They were seemingly so 
scared of the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic that they failed to spot 
the proverbial cliff and hence the prices of financial assets simply 
collapsed. This behaviour was confounded by the misinformation 
and inadequate actions of most national policymakers in the early 
stages of the pandemic. Furthermore, the economic impact of the 
Covid-19 pandemic in addition to the potential effect of Brexit was a 
drag on the equity market. 
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 Relative Time Event Influence bias is the tendency to let the most 
recent past event or information cloud a judgement.  
The relative time event influence bias is an extension of the 
availability heuristic, which dictates that people rely heavily on 
events from memory. The relative time event influence bias 
contends that generally, people tend to remember and thus be 
influenced by the most recent events or information. The bias 
dictates that as time moves forward, the influence of the event or 
information slowly diminishes as another critical event or 
information replaces it.  
The relative time event influence bias had a double impact on the 
market participants during the Covid-19 pandemic. Firstly, the most 
recent event was Brexit, which added more emphasis on the Brexit 
effect heuristic. Although the financial crisis had a more significant 
impact on the economy than the Brexit process, yet its influence on 
the decision-making process of the general public and more 
precisely on the market participants was waning. The issue is the 
potential impact of Brexit on the economy, which continues to play 
a significant role during the Covid-19 pandemic.  
The second factor of importance is the role of information during 
the pandemic. Since the relative time event influence bias dictates 
that as time moves forwards, the influence of information 
diminishes as new information comes to light. Thus fast-moving 
details and policy reaction during the Covid-19 pandemic added to 
the uncertainty due to the quick turnover of information.  
 
The Effects of Emotional Behavioural Factors during the Covid-19 Pandemic 
It is difficult to analyze such an event from a purely cognitive 
perspective; when the Covid-19 pandemic was an emotionally charged 
event. Hence, the affect heuristic may have influenced market participants 
during the pandemic, so there is a requirement to understand the 
emotional issues underpinning the decision-making process during this 
crisis. Contrasting with cognitive biases, emotional biases refer to the 
inability of market participants to separate emotions from investment 
decisions; thus effecting the market participant’s ability to make rational 
decisions. As illustrated by Figure 22, the Covid-19 pandemic inversed the 
financial cycle of emotion, meaning emotions were on a downwards trends 
with the price after the initial impact. From the optimal Covid-19 break-
line, 31st December 2019, the cycle of emotions was depressed, illustrating 
the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the global financial market. The 
problem was many, including governments, underestimated the severity of 
the pandemic and thus the global economic consequences. Moreover, it 
was only when the pandemic reached Europe that many market 
participants became aware of the seriousness of the Covid-19 induced 
crisis. 
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Figure 22. The Covid-19 Financial Cycle of Emotions 
 
Conversely, the market participants were affected by sentimental issues 
as well as the fear that the pandemic would affect their investments. 
Remember that generally, market participants do not act rationally when 
they cannot separate emotions from investment decisions. Furthermore, as 
maintained throughout, the impact of the pandemic on the global financial 
markets was confounded by the inadequacy of the governments' actions 
and mixed communications. Also, the lack of knowledge on the virus and 
global pandemic heightened the fear levels. Moreover, the impact on the 
economy from the health policies enacted to prevent the virus from 
spreading further was not truly known. These issues led to negative 
emotion behaviours by market participants in the aftermath of the 
pandemic, which are reflected in Figure 22 Critically, both the uncertainty 
behavioural factor model and the financial cycle of emotions as illustrated 
by Figure 21 and Figure 22 point to fear being the primarily emotional 
factor during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, we must not understate 
the role of the other emotions during the pandemic; thus, we will discuss 
all the emotional biases mentioned in Figure 21 and Figure 22: 
 Fear 
According to (Albulescu, 2020) and (Liu et al., 2020), the primarily 
emotional bias during the Covid-19 pandemic was fear and its 
related emotions. Therefore, although other emotions played a 
critical role in the behaviour of market participants during the 
pandemic, we will emphasise the role of fear.Fear is the one 
contiguous emotion that makes a person or group act irrationally, as 
so elegantly put by Bertrand Russell: 
 
“Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanly or think 
sanely under the influence of fear.” 
 
In truth, this elegant quote by Bertrand Russell strikes at the heart 
of the influence fear had on all levels of society, including market 
participants, during the Covid-19 pandemic. A fundamental 
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property of fear is like the virus; it is infectious. Therefore, once a 
group within society have it, it will spread to other groups.  
During the Covid-19 pandemic, fear was initiated by members of 
the general population getting or knowing someone that has been 
infected. Another channel for fear amongst the general population is 
the media effect cognitive bias or the impact of the news. The UK 
was one of the last countries to be infected by the virus; however, 
the news of the impact the pandemic was having on other countries, 
especiallywithin Europe, did raise concerns amongst the general 
population. Moreover, the increased infections within the UK 
towards the middle of March had the impact of hiking the fear 
levels amongst the UK’s population. As the government reacted to 
the pandemic, the fear spread to other issues; key amongst those 
issues was the economy and more specifically, the employment 
situation. As highlighted previously, the lockdown policy 
introduced by the government to control the virus infections,  
bought about an increase in job insecurity. It is a known fact that 
when people are faced with a heightened level of fear about their 
jobs, they tend to cut down on consumption. Consequently, leading 
to a feedback effect with the lack of expenditure hitting the 
organisations relying on the flow of cash, leading to an increase in 
job insecurity. Therefore, the pandemic had a double effect on the 
fear levels amongst the general population: economic and health.  
 
Abraham Lincoln is quoted as saying: 
 
“Democracy is the government of the people, by the people,  for the people.” 
 
In short, the last two statements state any government must serve 
its people to the best of its ability based on the circumstances at the 
time or face being elected out. Therein lays the problem faced by 
many governments, the pandemic represented a catch-22 situation 
in that to limit the number of infections; governments had to turn to 
policies that would harm the economy. However, to prevent the 
pandemic from causing any severe damage to the economy, they 
needed to phase out the policies quickly. The fear for most 
governments during the Covid-19 pandemic was that both the 
health issue and economic indicators were dire.  
As highlighted previously, the UK’s government delayed taking 
action until 23 March 2020. A possible explanation was that the 
government feared a any early response would be seen by many as 
unnecessary given the lack of information. An additional reason is 
the damage the policy will do to the economy. Once the study by 
Imperial College London was published stating that containment 
policy would put enormous constraints on the NHS and result in 
260,000 deaths, the government quickly changed its policy. The fear 
of a possible backlash from the public over the NHSand more 
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importantly, the number of deaths, far outweighed the potential 
impact on the economy.   
Conversely, the fear of the potential impact of the pandemic on the 
economy bought several fiscal stimulus policies to reduce the 
consequences of the lockdown policy. These policies included 
multibillion pounds aids for companies to prevent mass 
unemployment. The problem is these government fiscal stimulus 
policies in conjunction with lower fiscal revenue will mean a 
significant impact on the deficit and inevitably debt of the UK’s 
government. The white elephant in the room is the upcoming 
additional economic impact of Brexit in the next few years. So, it is 
essential for the UK’s government that the policies of the Covid-19 
pandemic do not overly harm the economy during a time of added 
uncertainties. 
During the Covid-19 pandemic, fear and its related emotions were 
crucial attributes in understanding the behaviour of market 
participants. As hinted by (Albulescu, 2020), the fear levels rose in 
conjunction with the number of countries infected. Further, the 
assumption is that market participants were reacting with distance; 
thus meaning that the nearer the Covid-19 pandemic got to the UK, 
the higher the fear levels were. In essence, as hinted earlier, it was 
not until the pandemic reached Europe that most people began to 
take note; the change in the FTSE 100 trend reflected this upturn as 
we entered March 2020.  The WHO’s announcement on 11 March 
2020 confirming the Covid-19 as a pandemic created a panic, the 
FTSE 100 loss 12.2% in the aftermath. Hence it could be 
characterised as a massive overreaction from the market 
participants, given that most people knew that Covid-19 was a 
pandemic by then. The key to understanding this panic is not in the 
upgrade to pandemic status, but the impact on the economy and 
financial status of organisations. The official status of the Covid-19 
as a pandemic bought home the fear that most market participants 
had of a significant adverse effect on the economy and hence the 
financial state of the publicly listed organisations. Moreover, the 
fear of subsequent waves of the virus is continuously being played 
out in the mind of investors which makes it even more challenging 
to stabilize the market. Another crucial factor in play is the impact 
of Brexit on the economy, especially since a deal has not yet been 
agreed, with the UK expected to formally leave the EU on 31 
December 2020 in the mid of a possible second/third wave of the 
covid-19 pandemic. 
 Denial or ignorance 
The difference between denial and ignorance is knowledge or 
information; whereas denial is the rejection, ignorance is the lack 
thereof. Therein lays the conundrum, was the Covid-19induced 
crisis the result of existing information or lack thereof on the virus 
and impact of a pandemic.The evidence from (Afelt, Frutos & 
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Devaux, 2018) and (Bailey et al., 2018) seem to suggest that there 
were warnings of the potential impact of a new coronavirus 
pandemic. Moreover, many have criticised the government for the 
lack of actions and communication, as hinted by (Cowper, 2020) and 
(Hunter, 2020). Conversely, as implied by (Baker et al., 2020a) and 
(Anoushiravani et al., 2020), the Covid-19 pandemic was likely to 
have a significant impact on the economy. In truth, the evidence 
was there from the start as to the pandemic and its effects.  
Furthermore, the UK was one of the last countries to be infected by 
the virus. Hence, there was prior knowledge of the virus and its 
impact on society and the economy. Thus, leading to the accusation 
of market participants rejecting the existing knowledge and living in 
denial. However, the truth may be a bit of ignorance and denial.  
 Regret 
The emotion of regret is the sorrow of a result based on a decision 
taken in the past. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is based on 
the inaction of many on the information available at the time. As has 
been established previously, market participants were in denial or 
simply ignorance of the information on the Covid-19 pandemic and 
its economic effect. Thus to a certain extent, the losses were 
avoidable; this would lead to market participants regretting the 
rejection of the available information at the time.    
However, regret is a double-edged sword with the capacity to hit 
at a later stage in the crisis. Hence, many market participants would 
have regretted the decision not to take the opportunity to invest in 
fundamentally strong financial assets at the low price induced by 
the pandemic. In other words, some market participants may have 
regretted not heeding the information at the time. Still, others had 
regretted not taking the opportunity to invest when the price was 
low due to the pandemic 
 Hope 
Every crisis reaches a point where market participants have raised 
hopes of the impact waning. During the Covid-19 pandemic, market 
participants raise hope due to the reduction in the number of new 
cases or countries infected. Another factor is the advancement of a 
new treatment which would help reduce the impact of the virus. 
With many competing organisations working on a possible cure, the 
likelihood is there have and will continue to be a lot of false down 
hopes. Conversely, the information does not imply these 
organisations are lying, but the treatment is not as advanced as 
reported by the news or politicians. In most cases, the report of a 
drug or inject that contains the virus is just to state that a  possible 
cure has been found; however,  the actual treatment is at the initial 
stage of testing. For listed pharmacy organisations, the release of 
such information could have a positive impact on the share price. 
There is another factor playing a role in the raising of hope during 
the Covid-19 pandemic; the impact on the country or organisation 
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may not have been worst than first feared.  So the market 
participants re-evaluate the effect, which raises their hopes. One 
critical factor to note, the hope displayed by the investors is 
temporary. Until there is a final cure which can be used; as will be 
illustrated later, the fear will always be of a potentially devastating 
subsequent waves, especially in the winter.  
 Overconfident and Greed 
Generally, overconfident occurs following the realisation of the 
harboured hopes. During any crisis, the hope is to find a working 
solution for the influencing issue. Thus, the Covid-19 pandemic was 
always going to be about a successful anti-viral vaccine and a 
massive global reduction in the fatality/infection rates. The 
realisation of this hope would generate a boost in confidence that 
would, over time, merge into overconfident that the crisis is over. 
Hence, market participants would become increasingly risk-loving 
due to the confidence gained in overcoming the Covid-19 crisis.  
Moreover, this confidence would generate a view among some 
market participants that the markets have not changed. Thus, 
making market participants believe that they could achieve the 
optimal price prior to the crisis. Therefore, many market 
participants would display the behaviour traits of greed. However, 
three critical factors are overlooked: 
 In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, the world had 
changed. A generally pessimistic view of the future is held by 
many. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic had inevitably changed 
the behaviour of many. This behaviour change will be difficult to 
reverse. Hence, as we have alluded previously, the economy and 
financial market will be affected for an extended period. Thus, 
meaning that the optimal price of some financial assets will be 
much lower than before the pandemic. This factor was in play in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis and to a lesser extent 
during the on-going Brexit process. 
 As alluded by the WHO, the danger is many people will be 
overconfident that the pandemic is over when a successful 
vaccine is announced.  On 3rd August 2020, the WHO warned 
‚there’s no silver bullet at the moment, and there might never be.‛ 
Taking into account the fear that like many related epidemics 
and pandemics of the past, there may be several highly infectious 
waves. Also, as highlighted previously; the covid-19 pandemic 
may not be the last due to the permanent changes that have 
affected the relationship between man and animals. 
Mainly due to these factors and the inevitable Brexit impact on the 
UK’s economy and some organisations, this overconfident and 
following greed may be ill-placed.  
 
The Reactions of Market Participants during the Covid-19 Pandemic 
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During the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, the reaction of market 
participants in the FTSE 100 was mixed. At the forefront of uncertainty was 
the impact of Brexit, a new Conservative government has just been elected 
with the promise of implementing Brexit deal or no deal. The markets were 
worried about a no-deal Brexit impacts on the economy. According to 
(Bevington et al., 2019), relative to staying in the EU, the effect on GDP per 
capita is -3.5% for a no-deal Brexit with a WTO agreement. However, 
according to (Hantzsche, Kara & Young, 2018) and (Levell et al., 2018), the 
impact could be as much as 3.7% or 3.3% respectively. Irrespective of the 
actual figure, the uncertain economic foundation presented a challenging 
backdrop for the market participants throughout the Covid-19 pandemic 
observed period.  
As hinted by (Huo & Qiu, 2020) and (Phan & Narayan, 2020), there was 
an overreaction by market participants during the Covid-19 pandemic. It is 
common practice to assume that market participants overreact to any crisis 
and to a certain extent, this is true. However, the reactions depend on the 
stage of the crisis; during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, as 
market participants’ fear levels were increasing, there appeared to be a 
stake of denial or ignorance amongst the market participants. It is assumed 
that this stake led to market participants underreacting to the information 
surrounding the pandemic. As the Covid-19 pandemic reached Europe, 
market participants began to learn about the impact of the pandemic on the 
economy and hence the financial status of many listed organisations 
increasing the fear levels. Thus, when the announcements by the UK’s 
government regarding the lockdown policy and the WHO confirming the 
pandemic status were made, the market participants fear levels were at 
heightened levels. Therefore, ensuring a  panic in the FTSE 100  as market 
participants overreacted to the combined impact of both these 
announcements. As hinted by (De Bondt, 2000), an overreaction is the 
disproportionate action to an event or information (fundamental or news) 
by the market participants causing a temporarily and dramatic deviation 
from the fundamental value. The fact that the market participants in the 
UK already knew that Covid-19 was a pandemic and that a lockdown 
policy with its impact on the economy was the only option available that 
would help avert a health disaster points to an overreaction to the 
announcements. 
The Covid-19 pandemic crisis was a lesson in the amplification 
mechanism and its effect on the loss spiral. Figure 23 illustrates how the 
pandemic affected the entire UK equity market. By early March, the impact 
of the Covid-19 pandemic had reached Europe; thus, market participants 
were able to extrapolate the potential impact on the UK. However, market 
participants were in stale status due to the actions of the government as 
hinted earlier; therefore leading to an underreaction in the equity market. 
Furthermore, the market participants were in a state of denial or ignorance 
regarding the Covid-19 pandemic and its effect on the economy and 
financial market.  
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Figure 23. Loss Spiral and Amplification Mechanism 
 
The change came as the government heeding the advice of a medical 
study by Imperial College London opted for an increasingly stringent 
policy to counter the impact of the virus. Thus, leading to an upturn in the 
fear levels as market participants reevaluated the effect of the pandemic on 
the economy and many listed companies balance sheets. Additionally, as 
highlighted earlier, the statements of the Bank of England impacted on the 
financial sector, and hence the economy increasing the fear levels still 
further. The market participants began to sell the financial stocks and the 
stocks with the highest affinity to the economy leading to the loss spiral as 
in Figure 23. The announcement by the WHO upgrading Covid-19 to 
pandemic status gave rise to a panic and thus, as illustrated by Figure 23, 
the amplification mechanism with the overreactions of market participants 
spilling over to other more secure assets. As highlighted previously, the 
critical factor was that many market participants knew the impact from 
other European countries on the economy and financial markets already. 
Moreover, the pandemic status of Covid-19 was a giving. Yet the market 
participants panicked pointing to an overreaction to the information and 
events during the later stages of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. 
The panic led to a loss spiral and amplification mechanism; the 
amplification mechanism dictates that during the Covid-19 pandemic,  
market participants already fearful of the impact on the economy from the 
evidence of the other European states were selling their perceived risky 
assets. The announcements by the Bank of England in mid-March only 
initiated the amplification mechanism, which gave rise to the loss spiral 
extending to the financial sector. The UK’s government announcements of 
changes in policies to increasingly stringent policies to tackle the spread of 
the virus further exaggerated the amplification mechanism which spread to 
the risky assets with direct affiliation to the economy, e. g. the retail sector 
or travel sector. The upgrading of Covid-19 to pandemic status by the 
WHO compounded the amplification mechanism and led to the final panic, 
which exaggerated the loss spiral. 
As noted by (Barberis, 2013a), an added complication is the effect of the 
loss and ambiguity aversions on the amplification mechanism and 
inevitably the loss spiral. Part of the explanation is the competence 
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hypothesis of (Heath & Tversky, 1991). The competence hypothesis dictates 
that the level of competence at analysing the situation determines whether 
the person is ambiguity averse or seeking. The premise maintains that the 
initial economic indicators during the Covid-19 pandemic made the market 
participants less competent in analysing the risk presented by the 
pandemic. Thereby increasing the ambiguity aversion of the market 
participants, leading to a reduction in their holding of risky assets, 
therefore further reducing the price of these assets.  
The other explanation relies on the loss aversion role, according to 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), this observes that the initial evidence of the 
implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on the economy made market 
participants increasingly loss avert leading to the selling of risky assets 
associated with the UK’s economy. The announcements by the UK’s 
government of increasingly stringent policies push up the loss aversion, 
therefore selling more risky investments.  The final straw which broke the 
camel’s back was the WHO’s Covid-19 updated status, which led to the 
panic. Both the ambiguity and loss aversions emphasized the amplification 
mechanism.   
 
 
Figure 24. FTSE 100 Daily Price 
 
Conversely, as hinted by (Albulescu, 2020), the fear levels increased with 
the number of countries infected. Key to the illustration of the fear levels in 
the market are the price and volatility. A look at Figure 24 and Figure 25 
illustrates the impact of fear; since 1984, there have been six events 
exhibiting fear behaviour. However, Figure 25 points to the announcement 
by the WHO on 11 March 2020 promoting Covid-19 to pandemic status as 
the highest volatility level. Moreover, Figure 26 illustrates the loss recorded 
on the day of these fear events; the Covid-19 announcement marked the 
worst one-day loss over the entire observation. We assume that any loss 
over 10% is a panic, hence giving our assumption there were only three 
one-day panics over the whole observation, with two being associated with 
a single event, Black Monday, on 19 and 20 October 1987. Although, as 
stated by Figure 25, the 2007/2008 global financial crisis did register a 
significant hike in volatility. However, based on our assumption, there was 
no one-day panics during the global financial crisis.  
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Figure 26. Major FTSE 100 EventDaily Loss 
 
The six-month observation of each crisis illustrates the continuation of 
the fear in the aftermath of the event. As explained by Table 2, except for 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy during the global financial crisis and the 
initial announcement of the virus by the WHO; the crises hit the low point 
within the first two months. However, both the initial Covid-19 
announcement and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy had long-run 
uncertainties; moreover, both were, to a certain extent, black swan events. 
Furthermore, both events had unforeseen effects on the economy.  
Conversely, the Covid-19 pandemic had the worst impact on the FTSE 100. 
Remember, we assume that any loss of over 10% could be regarded as a 
panic. Except for the EU referendum result, all the events had been effected 
by considerable panic runs.  So, another explanation is that there were 
unforeseen factors which had the impact of extending the panic run. 
During the Covid-19 pandemic, there were unknown factors such as the 
impact on the economy which may have extended the panic rum, 
remember it was not until the pandemic reached Europe that most people 





Turkish Economic Review 
B. Fakhry, TER, 7(4), 2020, p.214-265. 
259 
259 
Table 2. Major FTSE 100 Crises 6-month Period Worst Loss 









Start date 19/10/1987 17/08/1998 11/09/2001 15/09/2008 24/06/2016 31/1/2/2019 
Low point 09/11/1987 05/10/1998 21/09/2001 03/03/2009 27//06/2016 23/03/2020 
Loss 32.00% 14.97% 11.92% 32.51% 5.62% 33.79% 
 
The review of the FTSE 100 underlines the importance of understanding 
the market participants’ reactions during the Covid-19 pandemic. During 
the early stages of the pandemic, the reaction was rather mute; this was 
possibly due to a combination of factors described earlier in this section: 
 Ambiguity effect 
 Representativeness effect 
 Political effect 
 Brexit effect 
In truth, these factors highlight the significant lack of information 
regarding the Covid-19 pandemic and its effect on the economy and 
financial market. Moreover, they point to the impact of Brexit on the 
financial market in the early stages of the pandemic. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduced a new model of uncertainty behavioural 
factors to highlight the primary behavioural and external factors 
influencing any uncertain event. Moreover, the model is a graphical top to 
bottom illustration of the behavioural factors during an uncertain event. 
The aim is to provide a top-level view of the external factors, events, actors, 
cognitive and emotional behaviour factors, and market participants’ 
reactions influencing the uncertainty. We briefly highlighted the key 
general factors influencing the decision-making process of the market 
participants during any uncertain event. 
Crucially, we used the model to illustrate the Covid-19 pandemic impact 
on the behaviour of market participants in the FTSE 100 equity market. The 
effect from the pandemic came from the uncertainty surrounding the virus 
and implemented policies effects on the economy and balance sheets of 
publicly listed organisations. Not surprisingly, the lack of actions and 
mixed communications by the government led to the UK being the worst 
hit in Europe by the pandemic. The belated actions meant that the total 
number of deaths and infected cases are 46,526 and 312,289 as of 12th 
August 2020. However, the economic impact is -18.2% and -20.4% during 
the first two quarters of 2020 as reported by the ONS on 12th August 2020. 
So, the essence of the market participants’ fear is correct; however, given 
that most market participants were already anticipating the worst impact 
and knew that covid-19 was a pandemic, their actions could be 
characterized as an overreaction. What did not help was the 
communication and policies mixed up not only by the UK’s government 
but also by the Bank of England during the early stages of the pandemic 
impact in the UK. The fear levels remain high due to anticipated further 
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waves of the pandemic added to the effect of a no-deal Brexit on the 
economy in the next few years. 
The model was successful in highlighting the factors and actors as well 
as the cognitive and emotional behaviours influencing market participants’ 
decisions during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. We extended the model of 
heuristics and biases to enable us to explain better the behaviour of market 
participants during the Covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, the model does 
present a simple graphical top-level overview of the Covid-19 pandemic 
crisis. Furthermore, the model did explain the pandemic and highlighted 
the influence of the Brexit process. Finally, we are sure it could be extended 
to model any crisis.  
The concluding remark is that policymakers should not restrict their 
policies on the advice of a single group, especially in the adverse 
environment of apandemic or any other major crisis. Policymakers 
shouldthink before acting or communicating because the action may be 
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